Readers of ksnh blog should be interested by this academic analysis, in particular by the following quotes:

“Nothing in the nature of enhanced cooperation and its relationship with
the European Patent Organization stands in the way of conceiving the
unitary patent, as one must, as an autonomous title of protection, which
is fully based on European Union law, albeit of territorially limited
scope.”

“one hardly dares to inquire into the reasons, which have
driven the Union’s legislator, Commission, Council, and Parliament,
to adopt this monstrous, multi-tentacular patent protection, which they
will no more be able to tame.”

“Art. 142 EPC was meant to constitute the link to the once companion
Convention on the Community patent. When the Union took over the project
with a view to establish a system of patent protection of its own, the
Art. 142 EPC route was blocked. Instead, the Union had to become a
member of the EPO, this accession requiring an amendment of the Art. 166
EPC (see supra n.149). One reason why interested circles began to push
for cutting the language issue by moving to enhanced cooperation was the
assumption that it might open again the Art. 142 EPC route, thus helping
to avoid another loss of time and the risk of complications associated
with a revision conference for the EPC. Accordingly, Art. 1, 2nd sent.
Draft UPP Regulation pretends, by way of a legal fiction, that the UPP
Regulation constitutes the “agreement” within the meaning of Art. 142
EPC. This may well be the intention of the Member States participating
in enhanced cooperation. But does this intention matter or rather the
text of Art. 142 EPC, which is a rule of public international convention
law? Is it the will of the group wishing to have the EPO granting
unitary patents for them, which is decisive, or the will of the framers
of the EPC and of all its Contracting States? The question seems to be
trivial, given that the UPP Regulation guarantees the unitary effect as
required by Art.142 EPC. However, there is not only a taint of
circumvention of the law by Art. 1 proposed UPP Reg., which results from
the desire to escape the constraints of a revision of the EPC. Rather,
it matters both for the EPO and for the EU, whether the Union will be
able to act as a member, whether it will at least be able to act as a
common spokesman, who is legitimized by that enhanced cooperation is a
matter also of the EU and by that, in its substance, the unitary patent
will rest on EU law, or whether it is some Contracting States only,
which, as such, act as a group within the EPO. At the latest, when all
EU Member States will join enhanced cooperation, thus transforming it
into a full EU group, both the EPO and the EU will realize that Art.142
EPC was a shortcut leading into the wrong direction.”

“Note, that such substance and uniformity may not be maintained by
transposing Art. 6 – 9 of the Proposal of a UPP Regulation to the draft
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, as proposed by a resolution of
28/29 October 2011 of the “Intellectual Property Judges Association “
under the strongly voiced presidency of R. Jacob , and supported by an
opinion given by Kraßer for the European Patent Lawyers Association (all
available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/...). This lobby initiative has
been carried to the EP Legal Committee by MEP Wickström (see EP Legal
Committee, Draft Report Rapkay, EP Doc. 2011/0093 (COD) of 27 October
2011, Amendment 65 – 67), but for good reason has not been retained. Not
only does this proposal empty Art. 118 para.1 TFEU of its substance and
carry the unitary patent out of the Council’s authorization of enhanced
cooperation, since this agreement is to be concluded between the Member
States alone as an international convention outside the framework of the
EU. Rather, it also means that all the substance of the unitary patent
will be derived from public international law, and, thus, although part
of the framework regulation of the Internal Market, will be outside the
reach of the EU as regards any future amendments as well as beyond the
reach and oversight of the ECJ. The latter, of course, is precisely the
objective of the judges’ move, the reasons given being fears of delays
in infringement proceedings, and, indeed, that “the rulings of the
non-specialist CJEU would (not)be clear”, and that “the whole point of
creating a specialist patent court for Europe would be lost” (Jacob,
ibid.). This shows that every possible attempt is made to escape EU law.
However, the purpose of Art. 118 TFEU precisely is to confer upon the EU
the power to establish an intellectual property system and a policy of
its own. The provision has not been introduced to enable the EU to
delegate that policy to Member States. In this respect, enhanced
cooperation does not make a difference. Rather, it must be implemented
in the same EU-perspective, since its objective is to intensify market
integration with a view to expand it to the entire EU.”

And many other drawbacks in the curent regulations/agreement like the lack of provisions about compulsory licenses…